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Employment Arbitration
Agreements: The Case for Ethical
Standards for Dispute Resolution
System Designers
By: Michael L. Russell*
Dispute resolution design is an emerging field, both
academically and professionally. Attorneys, mediators, and
arbitrators, the other roles in the alternative dispute
resolution process, have codes of ethics which guide their
conduct.1 Dispute resolution designers, however, have no
such guidelines.2 This article uses the example of mandatory
arbitration agreements in the employment context to
*

Michael L. Russell is the founder of Russell Dispute Resolutions, PLLC in
Nashville, Tennessee. He serves as a mediator and arbitrator in disputes across
the United States. Mr. Russell also teaches alternative dispute resolution at the
Belmont University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges
Professor Rafael Gely at the University of Missouri College of Law, whose
comments contributed significantly to this paper. Any errors, however, are the
author’s alone.
1
For attorneys, see American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional
Conduct-Table
of
Contents,
ABA
(2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_
table_of_contents/
For mediators see American Bar Association, Policy and Standards, ABA
(2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/policy_standards/
For arbitrators, see American Arbitration Association, Revised Home
Construction Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AAA (August 1,
2018),
https://go.adr.org/homeconstruction.html.
2
Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 126 (2009).
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illustrate why this lack of ethical guidelines for dispute
resolutions designers is problematic.
In recent years, mandatory arbitration agreements
significantly impacted employment law and litigation.3
Employers increasingly turn to mandatory arbitration as a
way to resolve disputes more efficiently and cost
effectively.4 While these are worthy goals, the results have
often chilled employees’ substantive rights.5
Employees often sign mandatory arbitration
agreements without understanding their significance.6
These agreements are frequently part of a large number of
“onboarding” forms that must be signed.7
Indeed,
employees often do not realize they have signed arbitration
agreements until they file a lawsuit to claim an illegal
employment practice.8 In these cases, employees are
surprised to learn that they unknowingly waived important
legal rights and, in some cases, effectively foreclosed their
opportunity to seek legal relief.9
The two most problematic provisions that often
appear in mandatory arbitration agreements in the workplace

3

Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration, 16
GA. ST. L. REV. 293, 296–97 (1999).
4
Alexander J.S. Colvin, The growing use of mandatory arbitration, ECON.
POLICY INST. (April 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growinguse-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-morethan-60-million-american-workers/. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Our
Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is ReShaping Our Legal System, 122 DICK. L. REV. 349, 349 (2017).
5
Edwards, supra note 4, at 293.
6
Katherine Van Wezen Stone, Mandatory Arbitration: The Yellow Dog
Contract of the ‘90s, 73 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 1017.
7
Stone, supra note 7; Colvin, supra note 5.
8
Stone, supra note 7; see also Kilgore & Kilgore, Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements
Unfairly
Deny
Employee
Rights,
HG.ORG,
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/mandatory-arbitration-agreements-unfairlydeny-employee-rights-6859 [last visited Nov. 11, 2020].
9
Stone, supra note 7; see R. Wilson Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration?,
37 PEPP. L. REV. 459 (2010).
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context are cost sharing provisions and class action (or
multi-party) waivers.10
Mandatory arbitration agreements—which require
an employee to pay a significant cost of the arbitration—tend
to chill the rights of employees, as many employees do not
have the means to financially pursue their claims if they have
to pay a significant deposit to an arbitrator or arbitration
service.11 Fortunately, both the courts and arbitration
organizations, such as the American Arbitration Association
and JAMS, have recognized that cost splitting provisions
may chill the rights of employees and have mitigated this
risk.12
Class action waivers in mandatory arbitration
agreements, however, remain a problematic issue which
prevents large numbers of employees from vindicating their
rights.13 Courts have been hostile to efforts to minimalize
the impact of class action waivers in arbitration agreements,
and arbitration services have been powerless to ease their
impact in light of the developing jurisprudence.14
This paper will examine this issue and explore how
the enforceability of mandatory arbitration in employment
cases has evolved through the courts. The paper will also
discuss a possible path to overcoming the negative impact of
10
In this paper, the term “class action waiver” is used broadly. Often these
waivers prohibit any multi-party action, regardless of whether it is brought as a
“class action,” as that phrase is usually thought of in the context of FED. R. CIV.
P. 23. Unless specifically stated to the contrary, this paper will use the phrases
“class action waiver” and “class waiver” loosely to mean any provision in an
arbitration agreement that prohibits multi-party actions. See generally Shankle
v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th
Cir. 1999).
11
Edwards, supra note 4, at 293.
12
Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir.
1999); see JAMS Emp. Arb. Rules & Procs., Rule 31.
13
Hensler, supra note 5, at 370.
14
E.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662
(2010).
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these agreements and propose a modification in the approach
of dispute resolution designers that would provide a possible
remedy.
Dispute Systems Design
As a threshold matter, it is important to understand
what we mean by “dispute systems design.” Professor
Stephanie Smith and Professor Janet Martinez, who teach
Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) at Stanford, define
“dispute systems design” as “one or more internal processes
that have been adopted to prevent, manage or resolve a
stream of disputes connected to an organization or
institution.”15
This is a useful definition and broad enough to
address the issues treated in this article. To be sure, a
mandatory mediation program instituted by a federal or state
court would be a dispute system design.16 Likewise, a
detailed contract between two sophisticated corporations
which requires mediation and then arbitration in lieu of
litigation would be a dispute system design.17 Neither of
these examples raise the concerns addressed in this article.
In the former example, a court ordered mediation program
would likely be designed by neutral actors interested in the
fair administration of justice.18 In the latter example, two
well-resourced companies would likely be represented by
competent counsel able to protect the interests of their
respective clients.19
15

Smith & Martinez, supra note 2, at 126.
See generally How Do Courts Use ADR?, RESOL. SYS. INST.
https://www.aboutrsi.org/resource-center/how-do-courts-use-adr.
17
See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and
Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
221
(2004),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1322&context=l
cp.
18
RESOL. SYS. INST., supra note 17.
19
Leslie Ann Berkoff, Andrew Barton, Serena K. Lee, Peter R. Day, & Susan
Tomaine, Drafting ADR Clauses for Financial, M&A, and Joint Venture
Disputes,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N.
(July
11,
2019),
16
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Concerns arise, however, where a sophisticated
actor hires an attorney to draft a dispute system design that
will bind her client and a less sophisticated third party who
is neither represented by counsel nor stands in an equal
bargaining position.20 Examples would include mandatory
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts or executed by
new employees at the beginning of their employment.21 This
article uses the latter example to discuss the need for ethical
guidance for dispute resolution designers, though much of
the discussion would be just as applicable for other
mandatory arbitration agreements, including consumer
contracts.
The Problem of Arbitration Agreements Drafted to
Benefit Employers
Mandatory arbitration agreements began emerging
in the non-union employment context during the 1990s.22
These arbitration agreements were written by employers and
drafted to their benefit.23 Judge Harry T. Edwards of the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit observed
the potential problems of mandatory employment arbitration
in an insightful article two decades ago.24 He wrote:
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2019/07/a
dr-clauses/.
20
See Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Are Discriminatory and Unfair, PUBLIC
CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/article/mandatory-arbitration-clauses-arediscriminatory-and-unfair/.
21
PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 21.
22
Katherine Van Wezen Stone, Mandatory Arbitration: The Yellow Dog
Contract of the ‘90s, 73 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 1017 (1996); Harry T. Edwards,
Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration, 16 GA. STATE L. REV. 293
(2000).
23
Edwards, supra note 4, at 297-98; Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory
Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKLEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 71 (2014).
24
Edwards, supra note 4, at 293. Judge Edwards’ background makes him an
especially appropriate author to comment on this topic. He wrote:
The subject of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims
in employment has been a matter of great interest to the
courts in recent years. My thinking on this subject is
influenced by my current position as a federal judge. It
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Mandatory arbitration agreements in
individual employees’ contracts often are
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis;
there is no union to negotiate the terms of
the arbitration arrangement. Therefore,
employers are free to structure arbitration
in ways that may systematically
disadvantage employees; for example,
employers may limit the tools available to
employees for gathering evidence or by
prohibiting certain forms of relief. Or, in
order to discourage or prevent employees
from bringing a claim, a company might try
to impose a requirement that the employee
pay fees for an arbitrator, court reporter,
transcript, and hearing room-fees that
easily run hundreds of dollars per day.25
Professor Katherine Van Wezen of the Cornell Law
School and Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations
argues that “[m]any pre-hire arbitral agreements are blatant
contracts of adhesion.”26
Some of these agreements required employers and
employees to split the cost of the arbitration.27 Courts have

is also informed, however, by my former work as a labor
law practitioner in Chicago, my time as a labor law
teacher and scholar at the University of Michigan and
Harvard Law School, my extensive practice as a neutral
labor arbitrator for more than ten years, and my
significant involvements with the National Academy of
Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service during the time when I was an arbitrator. In
other words, because of my career path, I have more than
a fleeting interest in the subject.
25
Edwards, supra note 4, at 297-98.
26
Stone, supra note 7, at 1036.
27
Edwards, supra note 4, at 302.
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responded to these provisions with hostility.28 Judges have
largely understood that requiring employees with limited
means to share in the fees of a private arbitrator would likely
foreclose many claimants from having an opportunity to
have their disputes heard.29
In a 2000 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court
observed, “It may well be that the existence of large
arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively
vindicating her statutory rights.”30 In the employment
context, some courts have held that a provision in the
arbitration agreement which makes the employee
responsible for his or her share of the arbitrator’s fee renders
the agreement unenforceable.31
Even if a cost-splitting provision in an arbitration
agreement does not render it per se void, courts are still
hesitant to enforce them where there is a risk they could
effectively preclude a claimant from vindicating their
rights.32 The Sixth Circuit, for example, held that “potential
litigants must be given an opportunity, prior to arbitration on
the merits, to demonstrate that the potential costs of
arbitration are great enough to deter them and similarly
situated individuals from seeking to vindicate their federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”33 If claimants are able
to make this showing, then they cannot be forced into
arbitration.34
28
See Brady v. Williams Capital Grp., No. 114198/06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
Apr. 30, 2009) (finding a fee-splitting provision in the arbitration clause
unenforceable on public policy grounds).
29
Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the EffectiveVindication Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375,
411–412 (2014).
30
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
31
See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234–
35 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding requirement that employee pay half of the
arbitration costs inconsistent with the remedial nature of anti-discrimination
laws).
32
Chukwumerije, supra note 30.
33
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003).
34
See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663.
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The hesitancy of courts to force employees to share
equally in the arbitrator’s fees is shared by dispute resolution
organizations.35 For example, other than a modest filing fee
in the event the claimant(s) initiate the arbitration, the
American Arbitration Association and JAMS also generally
require the employer to pay the arbitrator’s fee and other
costs associated with the arbitration.36
Regretfully, employees have not been as fortunate
when opposing arbitration agreements that prohibit class or
Much of the early case law
multi-party actions.37
surrounding class action arises in the consumer context. In
2011, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the case that
opened the door to our discussion, AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion.38
In Concepcion, the Court held that
agreements that require individual arbitrations are
enforceable.39
Another hammer on the nail of class arbitrations
came in 2010.40 In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court addressed arbitration
agreements that were silent on whether class actions were
permitted in a particular dispute.41 The Court held that an
arbitration agreement that is silent as to whether class

35
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Employment Workplace Fee
(Nov.
1,
2019),
Schedule
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Employment_Fee_Schedule1Nov19.pd
f (last visited March 22, 2020); JAMS, Arbitration Schedule of Fees and Costs,
https://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration-fees (last visited March 22, 2020).
36
See sources cited supra note 36.
37
See Kacey L. Weddle, Supreme Court Rules That Employee Class Action
21,
2018),
Waivers
Are
Valid,
AM. BAR ASSOC. (June
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/productsliability/practice/2018/supreme-court-rules-that-employee-class-actionwaivers-are-valid/. See generally infra notes 39-53.
38
563 U.S. 333 (2011).
39
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341.
40
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
41
559 U.S. at 666.
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arbitrations are permitted must go forward on solely an
individual basis.42
Taking the next step toward relegating class
arbitrations to the ash heap of history, the Court handed
down American Express v. Italian Colors in 2013.43 In
Italian Colors, the Court held that a provision in an
arbitration agreement that prevented class actions was
enforceable—even if it rendered it economically infeasible
for claimants to pursue individual claims.44
The final nail in the coffin for class arbitrations
likely came with the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela.45 In Lamps Plus, the lower court
distinguished Stolt-Neilsen and held that class-wide
arbitration was permitted because the agreement at issue was
“ambiguous on the issue of class arbitration.”46 Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Roberts rejected this reasoning
and concluded that class arbitrations were prohibited, even
where agreements were ambiguous as to whether they were
allowed.47
For a brief time—during the Supreme Court’s
march from Concepcion to Lamps Plus—employee rights
advocates saw reason for hope in turning back the
momentum in favor of class action waivers.48 In 2012, the
National Labor Relations Board handed down the D.R.
Horton decision.49 This ruling found that class action
waivers in the employment context violated Section 7 of the
42

See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684–87.
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
44
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
45
139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
46
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1413. Cf. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684–87.
47
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416–17.
48
Krista M. Cabrera & Christopher Ward, Whatever the Court Decides It Won’t
End the Debate Over Class Action vs. Individual Arbitration. TALENT
MANAGEMENT & HR (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.tlnt.com/whatever-thecourt-decides-it-wont-end-the-debate-over-class-action-vs-individualarbitration/.
49
D.R. Horton, Inc. 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012).
43
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National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which rendered
contracts void if they prohibited concerted activity.50
When employee rights advocates attempted to use
the D.R. Horton decision in federal courts to invalidate class
waivers, they were met with mixed results. The Second,
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits rejected the NLRB’s reasoning in
D.R. Horton.51 By contrast, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits agreed with the reasoning in D.R. Horton, holding
that the arbitration agreements that prohibited class actions
were invalid under the National Labor Relations Act.52
The timing of this circuit split led some employee
rights advocates to believe that the stars were aligning.53 In
Epic Systems v. Lewis—which would resolve the circuit
split—the petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the
U.S. Supreme Court on September 2, 2016—approximately
two months before the presidential election.54
Judge Merrick Garland had been nominated by
President Obama to fill the vacancy on the Court left by the
untimely death of the late Justice Antonin Scalia.55 Judge
Garland’s nomination had been stalled by Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell, who would not bring his

50

D.R. Horton, Inc. 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012).
Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., 659 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2016);
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015); D.R.
Horton, Inc. v. NLRB 713 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013); Cellular Sales of Mo.,
LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.
702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013). Cf. D.R. Horton, Inc. 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012).
52
NLRB v. Alt. Ent., Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2017); Morris v. Ernst
& Young, 834 F.3d 975, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2016); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823
F.3d 1147, 1160 (7th Cir. 2016).
53
Cabrera & Ward, supra note 49.
54
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). For this case’s
procedural
history,
see
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/16-285.html
[last visited March 24, 2020].
55
Ron Elving, What Happened With Merrick Garland In 2016 And Why It
Matters
Now,
NPR
(June
29,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrickgarland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now.
51
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nomination before the Senate until after the presidential
election.56
This led progressives to believe that, at worst, they
would have the slightly left-of-center Garland. At best, they
hoped for a more progressive nominee than Garland, who
would assure them a liberal majority on the Court.57 This
hinged, of course, on the view that former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton was likely to win the general election in
November of 2016.58
Of course, to the surprise of many, President Donald
Trump won the election and subsequently nominated Neil
Gorsuch to the vacancy left by Justice Scalia.59 Judge
Garland never received a hearing, and Justice Gorsuch’s
confirmation solidified the conservative majority on the
Court.60
When Epic Systems was ultimately decided on May
21, 2018, it was Justice Neil Gorsuch who wrote the majority
opinion.61 The Court’s opinion rejected the reasoning of the
NLRB in D.R. Horton and held that class waivers in
arbitration agreements do not violate the National Labor
Relations Act’s prohibition against contracts that ban
concerted activity.62 The D.R. Horton decision, which held
much promise for employee rights advocates, was
overturned, and the validity of class action waivers is now
well-settled.63 The Court’s subsequent decision in Lamps

56

Elving, supra note 56.
Adam Liptak & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Shadow of Merrick Garland Hangs
Over the Next Supreme Court Fight, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 19th, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/us/ginsburg-vacancy-garland.html.
58
Liptak & Stolberg, supra note 58.
59
Julie Hirshfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch to the
Supreme Court, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/supreme-court-nomineetrump.html.
60
Davis & Landler, supra note 60.
61
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612 (2018).
62
Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1632.
63
See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1620–21, 1630.
57
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Plus (discussed above) was simply the period on the end of
a sentence which had already been written.64
The Attorney’s Fiduciary Duty to the Client
In the employment context of course, arbitration
agreements with class action waivers are almost universally
drafted by attorneys who represent employers.65 Under the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) Rules of Professional
Conduct, an attorney must negotiate several roles.66 He or
she “is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for
the quality of justice.”67 The Rules also provide that, “[i]n
addition to these representational functions, a lawyer may
serve as a third-party neutral, a nonrepresentational role
helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other matter.”68
While the attorney must balance these roles, the
lawyer nevertheless ultimately owes a fiduciary duty to the
client.69 Indeed the attorney owes a duty of undivided
loyalty to the client, which is breached when the attorney
acts on behalf of parties with conflicting interests.70 As a
consequence, lawyers who represent clients seeking to avoid
employment class actions at all costs will be duty-bound to
draft arbitration agreements containing class waivers. The
problem, of course, is that these agreements are one-sided
and serve as a barrier for claimants with small claims from

64

See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct 1407, 1412 (2019).
Edwards, supra note 4, at 297.
66
See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
67
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. § 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
68
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. § 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). While
Rules 1.12 and 2.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct give some
minimum guidance to the conduct of attorneys acting as neutrals, the primary
guidance for mediator conduct is from other sources, which shall be discussed
infra.
69
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 § 11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
70
RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 633 (3d
ed. 1989).
65
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aggregating them, which would attract the most competent
counsel possible.71
The Neutral’s Duty of Impartiality
In contrast to the attorney who represents a specific
party, a neutral must be impartial.72 Because the concept of
an attorney as a neutral is more recent than the ancient
practice of the lawyer representing the interests of their
client, a well-developed and ingrained set of ethical rules for
mediators does not exist. However, the significant efforts
over approximately the last twenty-five years to produce
standard for neutrals have uniformly affirmed the impartial
nature of a neutral’s role.73
For example, Rules 1.12 and 2.4 of the ABA Rules
of Professional Conduct briefly address issues mediators
may face, and the requirements stated in those rules clearly
affirm the importance of impartiality.74 Rule 1.12 addresses
the attorney–client relationship.75 Generally speaking,
absent consent of the parties, it prohibits a lawyer from
representing a party in a matter in which the lawyer
previously served as a neutral.76 It also generally prohibits a
lawyer from negotiating potential employment with
someone who is involved in a case where the lawyer is
serving as a neutral.77 Rule 2.4 primarily emphasizes that a
lawyer serving as a neutral must make sure that the parties
in the matter understand that the lawyer/neutral does not
represent them.78
In addition to the broad guidance of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, there are other resources that
71

See Colvin, supra note 24, at 85.
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
73
See generally MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS. (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2005).
74
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.12, 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
75
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
76
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.12(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
77
MODEL CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.12(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
78
MODEL CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
72
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provide ethical guidance for those who specifically serve as
mediators.79 For example, the Model Standards for Mediator
Conduct were first drafted in 1994 and revised in 2005.80
They originated as a joint effort between the American
Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association
Dispute Resolution Section, and the Association for Conflict
Resolution.81 Under Standard II, “[a] mediator shall decline
a mediation if the mediator cannot conduct it in an impartial
manner. Impartiality means freedom from favoritism, bias,
or prejudice.”82
Similar guidance exists when the neutral is serving
as an arbitrator.83 For example, Cannon I of the Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes provides that
a potential neutral “should accept appointment as an
arbitrator only if fully satisfied . . . that he or she can serve
impartially [and] that he or she can serve independently from
the parties, potential witnesses, and the other arbitrators . . .
.”84 There are also prohibitions on future professional
opportunities for arbitrators in order to maintain their
neutrality.85
Similarly, JAMS has promulgated guidelines which
provide:
An Arbitrator should remain impartial
throughout the course of the Arbitration.
Impartiality
means
freedom
from
79

MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005).
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005).
Model
Standards
of
Conduct
for
Mediators,
https://www.mediate.com/articles/modelSTDSd.cfm, MEDIATE.COM (Feb.
2005).
82
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 74, at
Standard II.
83
See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (AM. ARB. ASS’N 2004).
84
See AM. ARB. ASS’N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES, supra note 84, at B(1)-(2).
85
See AM. ARB. ASS’N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES, supra note 84, at C.
80
81

186

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/6

14

Russell: The Case for Ethical Standards
[Vol. 21: 173, 2021]

The Case for Ethical Standards
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

favoritism either by word or action. The
Arbitrator should be aware of and avoid the
potential for bias based on the Parties’
backgrounds, personal attributes or
conduct during the Arbitration, or based on
the Arbitrator’s pre-existing knowledge of
or opinion about the merits of the dispute
being arbitrated. An Arbitrator should not
permit any social or professional
relationship with a Party, insurer or counsel
to a Party to an Arbitration to affect his or
her decision-making. If an Arbitrator
becomes incapable of maintaining
impartiality, the Arbitrator should
withdraw.86
Therefore, the critical importance of neutrals being
impartial is well-settled. As discussed above, however,
arbitration agreements which prohibit class actions are
common.87 These leave employees with relatively small
claims no vehicle to hold employers accountable.88
The conundrum thus presents itself. The arbitrator
should be impartial, and the arbitration should be fair.
However, the attorney who drafts the arbitration agreement,
because of his or her ethical rules, must not be impartial.89
The Supreme Court, which should be the arbiter of due
process, has unequivocally rejected virtually all challenges
to draconian class action waivers.
The Importance of Stakeholder Involvement
One gravamen of the problem with one-sided
dispute design systems is the lack of stakeholder
86

JAMS ARBITRATOR ETHICS GUIDELINES VI(A).
D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012).
88
D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012).
89
Edwards, supra note 4, at 302; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 § 11
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
87
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consideration.90 In mandatory arbitration agreements,
employees frequently do not realize they have signed one.91
They certainly did not participate in the design of the dispute
system. Yet scholars have consistently observed that
stakeholder involvement is critical to dispute design
process.92 Professors Smith and Martinez have written that
“[s]ystem dysfunction can often be attributed to failure to
adequately involve and acknowledge the interests of key
stakeholder groups.”93
It is important to observe where controversy exists
in the arbitration field. Complex commercial agreements
often contain arbitration agreements.94 Sophisticated parties
to these agreements engage in arm’s length negotiations and
make the reasoned decision that private arbitration is
preferable to the more expensive and drawn out litigation
process. The same is true, for example, in the construction
context.95 Builders, architects, and other stakeholders in
construction projects routinely choose arbitration over
litigation for similar reasons.96
In the employment and consumer context, however,
controversy abounds. This is primarily because employees
and consumers have no input in the language and structure
of these arbitration agreements.97 There is no stakeholder
“buy in.”

90

NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL, DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR
MANAGING DISPUTES, 70-73 (2d ed. 2018).
91
See generally supra notes 39-53; Signing an Arbitration Agreement with Your
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/signingEmployer,
NOLO,
arbitration-agreement-with-employer-30005.html [last visited Nov. 11, 2020].
92
See Smith & Martinez, supra note 2.
93
Smith & Martinez, supra note 2, at 131.
94
Smith & Martinez, supra note 2, at 138.
95
Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing
Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 123, 154 (2007).
96
Schmitz, supra note 96, at 154.
97
Smith & Martinez, supra note 2, at 144; ROGERS ET AL, supra note 91, at 73.
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A Suggested Path Forward
Because the courts have largely closed the door to
challenges to unfair class waivers, it is the obligation of the
profession to address the issue.98 The difficulty is that, while
ethical obligations for arbitrators and mediators have
continued to develop, ethical considerations for dispute
systems designers have not.99 Indeed, there is an ethical
vacuum in the area of dispute resolution design.
Two significant steps should be taken toward
remedying this problem. First, the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct should be amended.100 Second,
because the Model Rules apply only to attorneys and the
universe of dispute resolution designers is broader than
lawyers, comprehensive standards of conduct for dispute
resolution designers should be developed.101
Regarding the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, paragraph 3 of the Preamble
should be
amended.102 As previously noted, the Preamble currently
states that “[i]n addition to these representational functions,
a lawyer may serve as a third-party neutral, a
nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a
dispute or other matter.”103 This provision should be revised
to add a specific statement affirming that if an attorney is
acting as a “dispute resolution designer” where a party to an
arbitration agreement is likely to be unrepresented at the

98
As noted earlier, an attorney is more than just a technician for the wishes of
his or her client. Rather a lawyer is “an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” MODEL RULES
OF PRO. CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see D.R. Horton, Inc., 357
N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012)
99
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute Systems
Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons From International
and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195 (2009).
100
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
101
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
102
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
103
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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time of execution, then the attorney is “acting as a
neutral.”104
This simple statement would provide significant
protection to unrepresented parties. It would bring those
drafting arbitration agreements within the ethical boundaries
of 2.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.105 Rule 2.4
says, “A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the
lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the
lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that
has risen between them.” (emphasis added).106
The plain language of Rule 2.4 means that a neutral
cannot simultaneously serve as a lawyer for one of the
parties.107 This means that a company desiring an ADR
program with an arbitration agreement would have to retain
the services of someone other than its own lawyer. Such a
result would provide the bar with an opportunity to develop
a robust practice for “neutral dispute resolution designers.”
These professionals, acting as neutrals, would then not be
encumbered with the fiduciary duty to one party that
currently restrains many drafters of ADR programs.108
Rather, neutral dispute resolution designers would
be able to freely consider the interests of all the various
stakeholders to an ADR program. Because they should be
impartial, these professionals would be much more able to
determine whether it was proper to include a class action
waiver in an arbitration agreement.109 While it might be
proper for these professionals to consider the economic
impact a class action lawsuit would have on an employer,
104

See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
106
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
107
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
108
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 71, at 633.
109
See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABORMANAGEMENT DISPUTES 1(C)(3) (prohibiting arbitrators from engaging in
conduct that would compromise or appear to compromise the arbitrators’
impartiality).
105
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they would also be obligated to consider the impact a class
waiver would have on employees.110 If a designer believed
that a class waiver would chill the ability for employees to
pursue their substantive rights, then they would be able to
disregard the employer’s desire for a class waiver without
breaching any fiduciary duty owed to one party over the
other.
Second, a comprehensive set of ethical rules for
dispute resolution designers should be adopted. Such a
move is not without precedent.111 As noted previously,
various stakeholders came together in 1994 to develop the
Model Standards for Mediator Conduct.112 A similar effort
should be made to develop guidance for those professionals
who serve as dispute resolution designers.
To be sure, these proposals are not magic bullets.
Those who retain dispute resolution designers will likely
attempt to exert influence over them.113 It is the power of
the purse. Nevertheless, these steps would have both
positive direct and indirect impacts.
First, in the case of attorneys, these proposals carry
an extra measure of accountability. Failing to draft dispute
designs which are fair and even-handed toward all
stakeholders would leave attorneys exposed to disciplinary
actions which would be costly to both their reputation and
finances.114

110

See Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The arbitration
POLICY
INST.
(Dec.
7,
2015),
epidemic,
ECON.
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/.
111
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
112
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
113
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(prohibiting interference with a lawyer’s professional judgment by one who
recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).
114
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(categorizing it is a professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt
to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another
to do so, or do so through the acts of another).
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For all designers, regardless of whether they are
attorneys, a set of ethical standards would begin the path
toward establishing dispute design as a profession that
exercises a measure of independence. Peers would be
expected to hold each other accountable for developing
systems that reflect the interests of those who are
impacted.115 There may also be an indirect impact on courts.
If professional standards are drafted, which create ethical
norms, courts may be more willing to scrutinize one-sided
arbitration agreements with class waivers.
Finally, and most importantly, neutral designers
would be free to bring all stakeholders to the table. In the
employment context, this means that employees could be
consulted. Surveys could be taken. Input could be received.
The final arbitration agreement would reflect the interests of
both employers and employees. Yes, this likely means that
class action waivers would be relegated to the ash heap of
history. Still, employment arbitration would be left to look
more like it should: an efficient, fair, and cost-effective
process designed to bring disputes to a conclusion sooner,
cheaper, and more justly than protracted litigation.116
Conclusion
Greater ethical guidance for dispute resolution
designers is sorely needed. Mandatory arbitration of
employment claims is an especially useful illustration of
why this is so. With the Supreme Court’s most recent
decisions in Epic Systems and Lamps Plus, mandatory
arbitration agreements are likely to be an even more soughtafter method for employers to eliminate the risk of

115

See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(requiring attorneys to report instances of observed violation of the Model
Rules).
116
Barbara Kate Repa, Pros and Cons of Arbitration, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html
[last visited Nov. 11, 2020].
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meritorious class action lawsuits.117 The unavailability of a
class action may well eliminate the ability of employees with
small individual claims, but significant aggregate claims, to
vindicate their rights.
Currently, attorneys who are retained by employers
are ethically required to give their allegiance to their clients,
even when the resulting agreement is procedurally and
substantively unfair to the unrepresented worker who signed
it.118 The federal courts have been unwilling to even the
proverbial playing field.119 Instead, the United States
Supreme Court has handed down a line of cases, uniformly
upholding arbitration agreements containing class action
waivers.120 It is therefore incumbent on the legal profession,
as professionals who are to advocate for a system that fairly
administers justice,121 to intercede.
A prudent path forward is through the ABA Rules
of Professional Conduct, which govern attorney conduct.122
The Rules should be amended to specify that attorneys who
are retained to draft ADR programs impacting unrepresented
employees are “third-party neutrals.” As neutrals, they are
to act impartially and consider the interests of all
stakeholders. Such a revision in the Rules, which are heavily
relied on by states, would be an important step toward
restoring the rights of workers whose valid claims are often
chilled by arbitration agreements containing class action
waivers. In addition, comprehensive standards of conduct
117

Epic Sys. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139
S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
118
MODEL CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
119
Am. Express v. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. 228 (2013); Epic Sys. v. Lewis, 138
S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
120
See cases cited supra note 120.
121
E.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(commenting, “This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of
the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative
process.”).
122
MODEL CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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for dispute resolution designers should be drafted, which
would further an expectation that designers act
independently with the interests of all stakeholders in mind.

194

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/6

22

